As the cost of prescription drugs continues to escalate, considerable attention is being focused on the interactions between pharmaceutical sales representatives (PSRs) and physicians as one source of the problem. Concern that pharmaceutical marketing practices have exacerbated increases in prescription drug costs prompted the US federal government to issue a recent warning to the drug industry to curtail some of their practices (The Washington Post, October 2, 2002) . A number of states have undertaken "counter-detailing" initiatives where state employees visit physicians in hopes of persuading them to switch to prescribing lower cost generic drugs (Wall Street Journal, August 22, 2001 ).
The US pharmaceutical industry is estimated to spend $4.7 billion on detailing, i.e., PSRs visiting physicians to promote their firm's drugs (IMS Health, April 1, 2002) . Further, the retail value of the free drug samples distributed during these visits is estimated at $10 billion. A typical PSR visit lasts 2-5 minutes where a PSR discusses one to three of the company's drugs. Information (and, at times, misinformation) about a drug's composition, therapeutic value, proper dosage, and potential side effects is communicated (Zigler, Lew, and Singer 1995) . Oftentimes PSRs will also provide information about retail price, dispense samples, and possibly offer small gifts to the physician.
Claims that these interactions with PSRs compromise physician integrity and affect prescribing behavior elicit heated debate. Two competing views have dominated discussion on the matter. The prevailing view contends that PSRs significantly influence physicians' prescribing behavior and that his influence has negative effect on patients' welfare in that PSRs encourage the physicians to prescribe more expensive branded drugs. Many public policy organizations and consumer advocacy groups adhere to this view. Waud (2000) , for example, states: "I have seen no evidence that the friendly detail man adds anything positive. I have heard anecdotes about occasional pearls passed on by detail men, but generally, the "education" is a thinly disguised selling job. And they are good at it." The Los Angeles Times (October 16, 2000) quotes a Blue Cross of California spokesperson's assertion that: "So much of what physicians learn about drugs comes from the weekly visits of the Kens and Barbies… They shower doctors with free drug samples, in part to encourage them to prescribe the product."
A prominent alternative view argues that PSRs do influence physicians' prescribing behavior, but this influence is positive in that PSRs provide physicians with valuable information. As a result, physicians are better informed and make better choices for their patients. Pharmaceutical companies and industry groups advocate this view. Spilker (2002) , for example, argues that the role of the sales representative is educational and that they "perform valuable functions that promote better patient care." Specifically they allow doctors to stay up to date on new treatments, new approved uses for existing medicines, contraindications, new dosages, drug interactions, and new ways to monitor the patients. Under this view, detailing is generally depicted as a mechanism for speeding up the adoption of new and better treatments, which leads to better patient outcomes.
Despite the substantial resources pharmaceutical companies invest in promoting their products and the controversy associated with pharmaceutical marketing practices, surprisingly little is known about the impact that PSR visits and free drug samples have on physician prescribing behavior. In point of fact, much of the evidence on PSR effectiveness is anecdotal. The empirical studies investigating the issue have been subject to data or methodological limitations that restricted the ability to control for potential biases and have come to contradictory conclusions regarding even the central issues: the effects of detailing on prescriptions (e.g., Parsons and Abeele 1981 vs. Gonul at al. 2001) , detailing on price elasticity (e.g., Rizzo 1999 vs. Gonul at al. 2001 , and even price on sales (e.g., Rizzo 1999 vs. Gonul at al. 2001 ).
Interestingly, even competing perspectives as to the role of PSRs, e.g., whether they are procompetitive or anti-completive in terms of influencing price elasticities (Rizzo 1999 , Gonul et al. 2001 , share a common view that PSRs have a substantive impact on physician prescribing behavior.
While possible, alternative considerations give rise to a third perspective suggesting that the impact of PSRs on physicians may well be minimal. For example, other sources of information (colleagues, scientific papers, and the physician's own training and experiences) are also available to physicians and these sources are likely to exert a much greater impact on prescribing choices. In addition, counter to interpretations of empirical results associated with the two primary views, a non-causal explanation may account for some of the observed correlation between physician prescribing behavior and PSR activity. That is, both physician prescribing behavior and PSR activity are influenced by some common factors such as physician practice size, i.e., bigger practices prescribe more and will receive more visits and free samples. It is necessary to control for these non-causal influences in order to properly assess the effect of PSR activity on physician behavior.
We have obtained access to a unique database that allows us to undertake econometric analysis that overcomes a number of fundamental limitations existing in past research. In particular, making use of a dynamic fixed-effects distributed lag model that accounts for physician-specific effects likely to induce bias if left uncontrolled, we assess the effect of detailing and sampling on physician prescribing behavior. The large number of observations in the database (it involves 3 drugs and 24 monthly observations for 74,075 physicians, i.e., over 2 million observations in total) allows us to accurately pinpoint the impact interactions with PSRs have on the number of new prescriptions issued by physicians.
We find that while detailing and free drug samples have a positive and statistically significant association with the number of new prescriptions issued by a physician, the magnitudes of the effects range from modest to very small. As such, our results contradict the two dominant views and support the contention that rather than being "easy marks," physicians are "tough sells."
Potential Limits to PSR Influence on Physicians
While most discussions of PSRs have focused on the factors facilitating their influence, less attention has been directed at the factors limiting this effect. Unquestionably, PSRs provide physicians with information about new and existing drugs. As PSRs are trained in persuading physicians, detailing takes the form of presenting facts and, as has been documented (Zigler, Lew, and Singer 1995) , misrepresenting facts about the drug in an effective manner. Physicians can come to rely on this information and change their prescribing practices accordingly. PSRs can induce trial of new drugs to the extent that they may be the main channel of information dissemination about new drugs and new indications for established drugs. The use of samples facilitates this process.
However, a number of conditions are present to suggest that despite their informative and persuasive capabilities, PSR influence might be minimal.
Most importantly, PSRs are not the only or even the primary source of information about drugs for physicians. Scientific papers, advice from colleagues, and a physician's own training and experience also influence prescribing practices. Indeed, most physicians view these other influences as far more important than that of PSRs. Peay and Peay (1990) report that out of fifteen potential information sources about drugs physicians rated PSRs twelfth in usefulness. It is not that PSR do not provide information. Rather, the consideration is that other sources of information are relied on much more frequently than PSRs. PSR influence is limited by the fact that many physicians view skeptically or hold negative attitudes toward PSRs (Lichstein, Turner, and O'Brien 1992, McKinley at al. 1990 ). Attribution theory suggests that with low source credibility, which is determined by factors such as a source's trustworthiness and expertise (Dholakia and Sternthal 1977) , arguments in a message will be discounted (Eagley and Chaiken 1975) . Physicians recognize that PSRs are neither experts, nor necessarily trustworthy and realize that information presented is biased toward the promoted drug and is unlikely to be objective, or even accurate (Connelly at al. 1990 ). Thus, physicians will discount information received from a PSR. Since physicians have access to alternative sources of information, which are more highly regarded, PSR influence may be very limited indeed.
Some additional characteristics of physicians would seem to make them particularly "tough sells." For example, the Friestad and Wright's (1994) persuasion knowledge model suggests that targets of persuasion use their knowledge about the persuasion agent and can effectively cope with and even achieve their own goals during a persuasion attempt.
1 Tests of the persuasion knowledge model revealed that busy targets with accessible agent motivation are particularly effective in resisting persuasion, e.g., they had the lowest evaluation of salesperson's sincerity and the greatest number of suspicious thoughts (Campbell and Kirmani 2000) . Physicians fit the profile of such targets: they do not allot much time to a PSR as they are busy and well aware that the PSR is trying to persuade them to prescribe more of his company's drugs.
When cast within the workings of other sources of influence, we would expect the ability of PSRs to influence physician behavior to be relatively small. As such, we hypothesize a relatively small effect of PSR activity on physician prescribing behavior.
Previous Empirical Research
The various studies assessing the effect of PSR activity on physician prescribing behavior have generated conflicting results. Indeed, on some of the most central issues, ranging from the effects of detailing on prescriptions, detailing on price elasticity, and even price on sales, studies have come to diametrically opposite conclusions. Methodological limitations, however, call into question inferences drawn from these analyses.
A few studies originating in the medical community are in the spirit of controlled randomized experiments, which are the "gold standard" in medical research. These studies compare physicians who did not see or were visited less by PSRs to physicians who were visited or visited more frequently by PSRs (Chren and Landfeld 1994, Powers 1998) . For example, Powers (1998) compared the prescribing behavior of 31 family practitioners versus 47 physicians in general internal medicine. The study finds that family practitioners prescribe more costly drugs than do internists. As family practitioners are visited more frequently by PSRs than are those in general internal medicine, the study attributes differences in behavior to PSR influence. The question unanswered is whether differences other than PSR activity (e.g., differences in type of patient seen) account for some of the difference in behaviors. More broadly, the limitation of these studies is that, despite claims to the contrary, they are not randomized in that PSRs do not determine which physicians to visit on a random basis. Rather, PSRs are going to see physicians more likely to utilize the drug or who prescribe in higher volume. This consideration invalidates these attempts to assess the effect of PSRs independent of controls accounting for motivation influencing PSR behavior.
The ability to potentially control for other influences is an advantage of regression based analysis. Past research has made use of different regression techniques to assess PSR influence.
Unfortunately, here too past research has been inadequate in controlling for physician-specific effects. Parsons and Abeele (1981) , based on data for 24 months and 14 territories, model the number of prescriptions sold in a given territory for a given month as a function of sales calls. The sales call effect is allowed to vary depending on samples and handouts. Interestingly, while sales call elasticity was positive when evaluated at the average number of samples and handouts, the estimated main effect of detailing was negative. While Parsons and Abeele (1981) do not report the inflection points, their model implies that at low and at high levels of handouts and samples, increases in detailing lead to decreases in sales. The most dominant explanatory factor in their model is sales lagged one period, which would reflect persistence in behaviors and carryover effects magnifying the influence of detailing. Alternatively, lagged sales could be reflective of territory-specific effects that are not modeled and, as such, could lead to biased estimates. Wotruba (1982) , for example, raises this possibility of territory specific effects (which might also be cast as a simultaneous equation bias issue
rising from an effect of prescriptions on detailing) to question the reported effects of detailing. Rizzo (1999) we can note problems in the analysis but cannot even speculate as to the direction of the bias. Gonul et al. (2001) , based on data involving 1785 patient visits, estimate a multinomial logit model assessing factors influencing physician prescribing behavior. Exactly opposite to the findings of Rizzo (1999) , they report that price has a positive effect on prescription probabilities and that detailing increases price sensitivity. They find statistically significant positive effects for detailing and sampling, i.e., PSR activities increase the prescription probability of a drug, but do not discuss variables." The extent to which their estimates are biased by the failure to control for unobservable factors remains unanswered, but this is one consideration that might account for the large estimated effects.
Empirical Analysis
A key benefit of utilizing pooled time series cross-sectional (i.e., panel) data is the ability to test for and control for the effect of unobserved fixed factors (Hausman and Taylor 1981) . These unobserved factors, if left uncontrolled, can induce bias in the coefficient estimates of the explanatory factors included in the model. Past research, however, has either not used panel data or not made full use of the benefits of panel data analysis. As such, caution needs to be exercised in interpreting the findings from past research and suggests the need for additional study. We make use of pooled time series cross-sectional observations (i.e., 24 months of observations across 74,075 physicians) and panel data statistical methods (i.e., a dynamic fixed effects distributed lag regression model) to assess the effect of detailing and sampling on physician prescribing behavior.
Data
Access to all the data used in the study was gained from a US pharmaceutical manufacturer with the only condition being that of insuring the anonymity of the firm and the drugs in the study.
Two different sets of data were merged to form the database. One data set pertains to the number of new prescriptions, i.e., number of new scripts, issued by physicians during a month for a given drug.
As it is based on new scripts issued, our "new prescription" measure reflects both new and repeat usage, but not refills accompanying the prescriptions. These data cover a 24-month period for 3 widely prescribed drugs. Thus, the total data sample we have available involves 74,075 US physicians who fall into the top six deciles in terms of their prescription volume for these drugs at the beginning of the data-reporting period. 3 Also provided was the monthly number of new prescriptions issued by each physician for competitor drugs in the corresponding therapeutic area.
The second data set pertains to detailing and sampling activity by PSRs for the same 3 drugs.
The company requires PSRs to provide information on the number of free drug samples left with a physician, which is tracked by physician signature and ID number, and is recorded along with the PSR's report on each detailing visit. The two data sets were merged into one database containing 3 The company providing the data tracks only those physicians who show at least some prescribing activity or receive some detailing and sampling. Our analysis pertains to this group of physicians and we cannot make any assessment as to the potential responsiveness of those physicians who rarely, or never, prescribed one of the drugs we study or were not visited by PSR's (e.g., the bottom 4 deciles).
information by month and physician on the number of new prescriptions issued for a drug, the number of detailing calls physician received that month for the drug, the number of the free drug samples the PSR left with a physician, and the number of new prescriptions physician issued for competitor drugs.
To reduce the possible influence of extreme values (outliers), which would arise from, for example, data entry errors and the common practice of one physician signing for all samples that later get distributed to a group of physicians present at a continuing medical education (CME) meeting or conference, we excluded the top 0.5% of observations for the number of details, samples, and new prescriptions. 4 While perhaps excluding some relevant information, the remaining data will depict the typical relationship that arises between PSR activity and new prescriptions issued by physicians for these drugs. Table 1 presents basic background information and descriptive statistics for the drugs included in our study. The drugs differ on a variety of dimensions: they have been on the market from less than one year to 11 years; annual sales range from under $.5 billion to over $1 billion; they come from different therapeutic areas. While the effect of detailing may vary across drugs, analysis of these 3 drugs offers some generalizable insights not only because they provide a cross-section of drugs in the marketplace but because they represent over 4 million PSR interactions with physicians.
Model
We employ the following dynamic fixed effects distributed lag regression model to assess the effect of detailing and sampling on new prescriptions: where Prescribe it , Details it , Samples it , and Competitor it are, respectively, the number of new prescriptions issued, the number of PSR visits, the number of free drug samples received, and the number new prescriptions issued for competitive drugs by physician i at time period t. Time(τ) is an indicator function that takes on the value 1 when the time period is τ, 0 otherwise (i.e., separate dummy variables for each monthly time period), Specialty(s) is an indicator function that takes on the value 1 when the specialty area of the physician is s, 0 otherwise (i.e., separate dummy variables for each of the 11 specialty areas), and Trend is the observation number for a given month and year.
Since it includes both current-term and lagged variables in the model, Equation 1 allows for a wide range of possible effects and influences, e.g., serial correlation (current-effects) and state-dependent (persisting) dynamic relationship.
A key characteristic of Equation [1] is that it allows for a physician-specific effect, i.e., the intercept α i is allowed to vary by physician. This consideration acknowledges that physician behavior patterns are influenced by unobserved or unobservable factors, e.g., physician characteristics. To the extent that these unobserved factors are correlated with detailing and sampling, analysis not controlling for their effects will result in biased estimated effects for the marketing phenomena. While we later use a Hausman (1978) specification test to empirically assess the role played by fixed effects, we have a priori reason to believe that these unobserved factors will in fact be correlated with marketing activity. For instance, larger practices will generate more prescriptions and will also attract more detailing. As such, a spurious positive correlation, i.e., unrelated to any potential effects of detailing, will exist between detailing and prescriptions due to a joint correlation with practice size.
As the effects of PSR activity are unlikely to be limited to the month when the visit occurred, we allow for current and lagged effects for both detailing and sampling. The number of observations available in our data sample allows us to directly estimate separate effects for lagged term rather than imposing a specific decay pattern as a necessity for preserving degrees of freedom. We do, however, need to specify the length of time that a PSR visit might influence physician behavior. We select a 6-months lag length under the view that the effect of a visit will dissipate substantially by this period, but do test for longer-term lagged effects as well. Still, we expect the effects of detailing to be largest in the months closest to the visit. The cumulative direct effect of detailing and sampling can be obtained simply by summing the coefficients, i.e., and γ j .
Lagged values for new prescriptions (Prescribe it-j ) capture autocorrelation in the series that arises through inertia and persistence in physician behavior. These autoregressive effects play a key role in that they magnify the effects of detailing and sampling. That is, the total effects of detailing and sampling involve both a direct effect on prescriptions and an indirect effect that arises through persistence in physician behavior. As such, the total effect of detailing and sampling can be As we include both lagged own prescriptions and lagged competitors' prescriptions, the model separates lagged total demand dynamics into two key components: competitive substitution and own demand growth. Lagged competitors' prescriptions will have a negative impact on prescriptions as they capture the substitution effects that physicians make between competing drugs.
The current competitive prescriptions, however, will capture two different phenomena: they will reflect not only substitution effects but also changes in total demand due to market expansion or contraction. In this regard, current-term competitive effects will be acting as a proxy for two different phenomena with opposite effects, i.e., negative substitution effects and positive market demand effects. As such, the current-term coefficient (λ 0 ) will depend on the relative magnitude of the two conflicting effects and, therefore, the sign of the effect cannot be postulated a priori.
The other variables in Equation [1] are time-period-specific intercepts and specialty-specific trends. The time-period-specific intercepts (the coefficients δ τ ) allow for the fact that the number of prescriptions may differ across time periods. These intercepts capture not only seasonal effects but all brand-wide influences that shift prescribing behavior across all physicians (e.g., price changes, changes in the set of alternative medications available, changes in advertising campaigns, etc.). That is, the inclusion of the time specific dummy variables will capture all effects common across physicians, which would include the diffusion pattern for the drug, research reports in scientific journals, any negative or positive publicity for the brand or its competitors, etc. The 11 specialtyspecific trends κ s capture influences that shift prescribing behavior across all physicians in a particular specialty.
In order to remove the influence of physician specific effects (i.e., α i ), we take first differences of Equation 1 to obtain:
As we do not have data on the marketing activities of competitors, we cannot assess competitive marketing effects. The model, however, does have a mechanism to control for their influence. Competitor sales will to a large extent capture these effects and reduce potential omitted variable bias. That is, to the extent that changes in firm and competitor marketing activities are correlated across physicians (low correlation between changes in firm's and competitors' marketing activities would limit the extent of this bias), not accounting for competitive marketing activity would result in biased estimates of the own detailing and sampling effects. However, since competitor marketing will influence competitor sales, the competitor sales variable in our model will act as a proxy variable (Wickens 1972) for competitor marketing expenditures and, as such, reduce potential omitted variable bias.
We estimate Equation [2] using instrumental variable estimation as ordinary least squares will generate biased estimates of the coefficients for ∆Prescribe it-1 and ∆Competitor it . By construction ∆Prescribe it-1 will be correlated with the differenced error term η it and just as substitution effects cause competitor prescriptions to influence own prescriptions, own prescriptions will influence the amount of competitor prescriptions. We use lagged values of the series, i.e.,
Prescribe it-2 , Prescribe it-3 , Prescribe it-4 , Prescribe it-5 , Prescribe it-6, and Competitor it-2 , Competitor it-3 , Competitor it-4 , Competitor it-5 , Competitor it-6, to generate instrumental variable estimates for ∆Prescribe it-1 and ∆Competitor it . This procedure generates consistent (i.e., asymptotically unbiased) estimates of the parameters and their standard errors (Anderson and Hsiao 1982) .
As our dependent variable is the number of new prescriptions issued, initial inclinations might suggest the applicability of count data regression methods, e.g., the Poisson or negative binomial estimators. A number of considerations, however, point to the advantages of the fixed effect estimator we employ. The applicability of our estimator stems from the fact the error term in Equation 2 is "reasonably well" approximated by a normal distribution. Consistent with a normal distribution, the skewness of the error term is near zero. The fact that we take differences of the data transforms the data from a non-symmetric to a symmetric distribution. The kurtoses for
Results
For each of the 3 drugs in our study, we estimated the Equation [2] regression model. Table   2 reports the estimated coefficients. Figures 1 and 2 graphically depict the estimated effects of detailing and sampling, respectively.
Persistence in Prescribing Behavior
For each of the three drugs in the study we observe significant persistence in physicians' prescribing behavior. While the first order autocorrelation is the most substantial for all three drugs, 
Detailing
For each of the three drugs in the study we observe statistically significant positive, albeit rather small, effects of detailing on prescriptions. Both current-term and carryover effects exist. For Drug A, statistically significant positive effects are present contemporaneously and for the subsequent 4 months, (.120, .103, .062, .065, .047, respectively) . The effects for months 5 and 6, i.e., .003 and .016, are statistically insignificant. The cumulative direct effect that an additional PSR the error terms for the 3 drugs in our study are 3.9, 3.4, and 2.4, respectively, as opposed to 3.0 for the normal distribution. The differences, however, will not impact the coefficient estimates (least squares is still efficient in the class of linear estimators) and will have a barely discernable impact on confidence intervals. While a fixed effect Poisson regression would be an inappropriate estimator as our data are over-dispersed (the Poisson model in based on the assumption that the variance of the data is equal to the mean), a fixed effect negative binomial estimator has merits. However, existing methods and statistical properties for this type of estimator are not well-developed for the type of model we propose. In particular, existing estimation methods (i.e., Hausman, Hall and Griliches 1984) have been questioned as to their ability to in fact control for time-invariant covariates (Allison and Waterman 2002) , have not yet been developed or had their statistical properties assessed for dynamic models allowing for persistence (Greene 2001) , and prohibit the use of lagged variables for instrumental variable estimation. If and when these issues become resolved, we would expect little (if any) difference between the results obtained from the estimation procedure we employ and those obtained from a fixed effects negative binomial estimator.
visit has on the number of new prescriptions (i.e., the sum of the estimated coefficients) is .415 (std=.089). The total effect that detailing has on prescriptions depends jointly on this direct effect and on the indirect effect that arises through the persistence of physician behavior. Accounting for both these effects (calculated as ∑ / [1-φ j ]) yields an estimated total effect 1.56, with a 95% confidence interval of [.80; 2.23]. The estimated response to a change in PSR visits for Drug B is similar to Drug A in that we observe a statistically significant response the month of the visit that diminishes over the subsequent 6 months. The magnitude of the effect, however, is smaller. The estimated effects for months 0 through 6 are .054, .033, .026, .023, .014, .002 and -.001. These sum to a cumulative direct effect of .151 (std=.029). Once we consider the persistence in the prescribing process, the total effect of one detailing visit for Drug B is estimated at .32, with a 95% confidence interval of [.219; .428] . In other words, on average, it takes an additional 3.11 PSR visits to generate an additional new prescription for Drug B.
For Drug C we again observe similar results in that the estimated effect of a PSR visit is statistically significant, but small in magnitude. The estimated effects for months 0 through 6 are .021, .028, .024, .021, .012, .011, and .010, respectively. All estimates are statistically different from zero. The estimated cumulative direct effect of .129 (std=.024) is the smallest of the three drugs studied. Further, as Drug C prescriptions exhibit the lowest persistence, the total effect of one detailing visit for Drug C is also the smallest at .153, with a 95% confidence interval of [.105; .201] . 7 As the estimated total effect involves the ratio of normal variables, its distribution will be non-normal. We make use of simulation methods based on the Model [2] coefficient estimates, their variance-covariance matrix, and 10,000 draws to construct confidence intervals (Krinsky and Robb 1986). This indicates that it would take an additional 6.54 PSR visits to induce one additional new prescription of Drug C.
Sampling
We also observe statistically significant but small effects for sampling. Sampling for Drug A has a positive and statistically significant contemporaneous effect (.018), but statistically insignificant effects for months 1 through 6 (.002, .006, .006, .004, .007, and -.003, respectively). The estimated response to sampling is smallest for Drug C. The estimated effects are .007, .003, .001, .0005, -.0003, .00001, and .0001, with only the contemporaneous and 1 month lag effects being statistically significant. The estimated cumulative direct effect is .012 (std.=.005). Since the persistence level is very low for Drug C, the total effect of one free drug sample is only slightly higher at .014, with a 95% confidence interval of [.0042; .0232 ]. This means that it takes 73.04 additional samples of Drug C to generate one new prescription.
Competitive Prescriptions
As discussed earlier, the instrumental variable for the contemporaneous competitive prescriptions captures 2 distinct phenomena with two distinct effects, i.e., a positive effect of growth in total demand and a negative effect of brand switching. The positive contemporaneous effect observed for Drugs A and B is consistent with the growth in demand effects dominating brand switching. For Drug C, the statistically insignificant estimate implies that contemporaneously the market growth effects essentially cancel out the brand switching effects. As expected, consistent with brand switching, we observe negative effects for lagged competitive prescriptions. The inclusion of these competitive effects in the model is important not only in helping explain new prescriptions but also in allowing us to isolate the persistence in physician behaviors. That is, since competitive prescriptions are correlated with own prescriptions, failure to model these competitive effects would results in biased estimates of the autocorrelation coefficients and, as a result, biased estimates of total detailing and sampling effects.
Other Influences
The model also includes dummy variables capturing time-period specific effects (as our model involves first differences of the data and 6 lags, time period 1 is the 8th month of data in our 24 months sample) and differences among specialties. While we find some specialty area effects and time-period specific differences, little correlation exists, however, between the change in detailing or sampling and these control variables. As such, their inclusion in the model has little impact on the estimated direct effects of detailing or sampling. It does, however, significantly affect the estimates of persistence. Failure to control for unobserved time-period specific influences on prescribing behavior leads to biases in the estimates of persistence and, therefore, biased estimates of total detailing and sampling effects. In Appendix A we provide additional discussion of this issue.
Model Validation and Sensitivity Analysis
We undertook a number of sensitivity tests to assess the validity of the model [1] and stability of our results. In all cases, we found no evidence that calls into question the results we report. For example, we modified Equation [2] to allow for the possibility of longer lagged effects of detailing and sampling. The estimated effects for months 7 through 12 were small and statistically insignificant. The results were not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of outliers. Estimating model [2] with a data set that either excludes more extreme values or includes more extreme values produced results in close correspondence to those reported. We also allowed for the possibility of feedback effects (i.e., simultaneity) as the change in new prescriptions may influence the change in detailing and sampling. A Hausman (1978) specification test failed to reject the null hypothesis of no such feedback. We tested alternative functional specifications but found no evidence of non-linearity in the relationships.
8 For example, we failed to observe a non-linear detailing response function (e.g., squared-terms were insignificant and a piece-wise regression model failed to show any difference in estimated coefficients for physicians with above versus below average detailing activity). We also failed to observe non-linearities associated with interactive effects (e.g., interaction terms involving detailing and sampling were insignificant).
While consistent, the estimates we report would not be efficient if in fact physician-specific effects were not present. Equation 1 with a uniform constant (α), rather than a constant varying by physician (α i ), would generate more efficient estimates under this scenario. A Hausman (1978) specification test, however, rejects at above the 1% level the hypothesis of a uniform constant. 9 Not modeling the physician-specific effects results in biased estimates of not only the coefficients for PSR activities but also the estimates of the autocorrelations in new prescriptions. The biases are particularly severe for the estimated effects of sampling. The estimated total effects of sampling from the model ignoring fixed effects are on average 5 times greater than those we report. The
Hausman specification test documents the presence of significant physician-specific fixed effects and strongly rejects the "naïve" (i.e., no-fixed-effects) model specification. A failure to control for these effects in the "naïve" model generates biased estimates of PSR influence.
In addition to the modeling of physician-specific effects, the modeling of persistence in physician behavior also plays a key role in influencing estimates of the detailing and sampling effects. That is, as physician persistence magnifies influences, substantial differences can exist between estimates of direct effects and total effects. As mentioned previously, we find that the estimates of persistence (i.e., the coefficients for lagged prescriptions) depend on the inclusion of lagged competitor prescriptions in the model. Estimates of persistence are substantially lower across all the drugs in the study (in two cases close to zero) if higher-order lags of own and competitor prescriptions are not included in the model as well. This finding follows directly from the standard omitted variable bias consideration, i.e., leaving out a variable, which is negatively correlated with the dependent variable but positively correlated with an included variable, results in a downward bias in the estimates of the included variable. This consideration is one factor that might explain why we find persistence in physician prescribing behavior while some other studies that allow for a dynamic effects framework but lack the competitive prescribing data are unable to detect it (e.g., Manchandra et al. 2000, 2003) . In Appendix A we provide further discussion of some alternative models and how differing types of model mis-specification influence the estimated effects of detailing and sampling.
We have also investigated the possibility that data reporting problems (i.e., measurement error) might be biasing our estimates of the effect of detailing downward. Both random measurement and systematic error (PSRs might be motivated to over-report either the number of drugs they promoted to a physician on a particular visit or the number of visits that occurred) might lead to a bias towards zero in the estimated effect of detailing. To assess this possibility we estimated our model including only those details that were also accompanied by drug samples. We can be reasonably certain that these details did in fact occur, as the sampling data is recorded by a third party from the receipt slips signed by the physician receiving the free samples. The estimates of the detailing effect obtained from estimating Equation [2] on this restricted data sample are indistinguishable from those we reported in Table 2 . As such, we have no reason to believe that our results are driven by measurement error bias.
The possibility still exists that some characteristics of the drugs in our study may differ from those where detailing is effective. That is, our results may capture the effect of detailing and sampling for the drugs studied, but these drugs may not be reflective of drugs where PSR activity is likely to be influential. For example, PSR activity might be posited to be more effective for new as opposed to established drugs. This could account for the modest effects found for drugs A and B.
Drug C was new to the market. It had, however, disappointing sales. Might the effects of PSR's be greater for drugs, new to the market, that ultimately achieve success in the marketplace? To answer this question we obtained data on a fourth drug, which was new to the market and achieved commercial success during the period of study. It also differed from the drugs in our study in that it was in a new therapeutic class and had few (only one) direct competitors. Despite these differences, estimation of Equation [2] for this fourth drug generated similar results to those obtained for the other drugs on our study. The estimated cumulative direct effects were .15 for detailing and .013 for sampling. With an estimated persistence of .25, this gave rise to total effects for detailing and sampling of .20 and .017, respectively. As such, we find no evidence to questions the generality of our findings based on unique features of the three drugs in our study. Analysis of this fourth drug generates findings very similar to those that we observe for Drug C.
While our sensitivity analysis failed to challenge the Table 2 results, additional investigation is still warranted. A number of directions are of potential promise for future research. One direction would involve assessing the characteristics of drugs that induce variation in PSR responsiveness.
That is, what can explain the differences in PSR responsiveness that we observe among the drugs studied? A variety of factors, ranging from time on the market to the efficacy of the drug, might induce differences in responsiveness. Further, analysis assessing which physicians are most responsive to PSR influence and why this occurs would be of considerable value both from a public policy standpoint and from the standpoint of increasing marketing's understanding of factors influencing responsiveness to sales force efforts. While our results provide aggregate effects, differences in responsiveness may exist across physicians. Physician characteristics as varied as, for example, specialty area, size of practice, gender, and age might be able to account for inter-physician differences in responsiveness.
Discussion
The focus of our study was to assess the magnitude of physician responsiveness to two main practices of pharmaceutical marketing while controlling for other possible influences on prescribing.
Are physicians 'easy marks'? To the contrary, our results show that physicians are 'tough sells' in that sales force activity has effects on prescribing behavior that range from modest to very small. For the 3 drugs in our study the estimated total effects on new prescriptions are 1.56, .32, and .153 for detailing and .155, .039, and .014 for sampling. In other words, physicians are most responsive to PSR activities for Drug A where an additional prescription would arise from a .64 increase in detailing or a 6.44 increase in sampling. They are least responsive to PSR activities for Drug C where an additional prescription would result from 6.54 additional PSR visits or 73.04 additional samples.
The high statistical significance of the estimates indicates that these marketing activities have an effect on the number of new prescriptions. But, the magnitude of the effect indicates that PSR activities have only a small impact. The large sample size provides small standard errors (allowing us to distinguish between a very small effect versus a statistically insignificant effect) so that we are able to accurately pinpoint just how small the positive effect is. The estimated effects are in some cases an order of magnitude smaller than has been speculated based on anecdotal evidence or reported in prior research.
Given the small response to PSR activity, the question is no longer "are physicians 'easy marks'?" but rather "why do drug companies make such extensive use of PSRs given their limited effectiveness?" It appears that drug company profits might be enhanced (or drug prices reduced) through costs savings achieved through a reduction in PSR numbers. While this may be so, some additional issues need to be considered. First, it should be remembered that our estimates reflect the effect of a visit on the sales of a single drug. As a PSR will discuss more than one drug during a visit, the impact of a given visit will be greater than the effect on a single drug. Second, the reported estimates relate to "new scripts" issued. Sales of the drug, however, will also be based on the refills accompanying the prescription, which average between 2 and 3 for the drugs in our study. Both these considerations magnify the financial implications of a detailing visit. Further, the margin to the pharmaceutical firm on a drug can be considerable. 10 These considerations lead us to believe that the returns to detailing for Drug A are positive, which stems both from its larger margin and the larger estimated physician response to detailing, but are negative for Drugs B and C.
Why would the firm engage in a practice that has negative returns? One possible explanation is suggested by practitioners' comments: "No one is really sure if sending the legions of reps to
doctors' offices really works. Everyone is afraid to stop it, because they don't know what difference
it's making" (Narayanan et al. 2003) . Indeed, the number of PSRs is now over 80,000; it has almost doubled in the past five years, while the number of physicians remained constant (The Wall Street Journal, April 23, 2002) . For some drugs (e.g., those with lower margins) the current detailing system may be sub-optimal, which might be a result of the intensive PSR 'arms race' of the 90s. This is consistent with a recent McKinsey report (Elling at al. 2002 ) that questions the effectiveness of the current PSR system and advocates that pharmaceutical companies transform their sales model.
We do not wish to make any value judgments about the magnitude of physician's responsiveness to PSR visits and the reasons behind it. Responsiveness may mean that physicians are better internalizing information about a drug and the result is better patient outcomes or care at a lower cost. Alternatively, responsiveness may simply reflect brand switching among drugs that provide similar benefits. While drug company revenues would be affected, patient care or costs would not. However, responsiveness to PSRs could end up in inferior patient care or in higher costs when physicians prescribe, for example, branded drugs that are no more effective than a generic equivalent but are higher priced (Gold 2001) . Whatever the relative costs and benefits, the bottom line remains that the average effect of PSR activity on physician prescribing behavior is small. The public policy debate would be better served by recognizing the modest effect PSR activity has on physician prescribing behavior. The sum of the number of physicians in each of the three data sets is greater than the total number of physicians in the study (74, 075) as some physicians are in the upper 60 prescribing percentile for more than one of the drugs in our study. ** We provide ranges for sales volume of each drug, as opposed to a specific number, to help insure the anonymity of the drug.
‡ as reported in Mosby's GenRx reference for the relevant time period. ‡ ‡ The primary care specialty area includes family practice, general practice, internal medicine, and osteopathy. The model also includes time-period-specific and specialty-specific intercepts. The number of observations differs from that in Table 1 due to the taking of first differences, the inclusion of six lagged terms, and removing outliers.
‡ ‡ Instrumental variable estimate utilized. * P value < 0.05 it reports biased upward estimates of the contemporaneous detailing and sampling effects. The implied total effects are also biased upwards.
Model X.3 explicitly allows detailing and sampling activity to have not only contemporaneous but also carry-over effects as well and, in contrast to Model X.2, does not impose a specific decay structure on the carry-over effects. An interesting artifact of the Model X.3
(mis)specification is that the estimation results suggest little or no dissipation of detailing and sampling effects. We report a 12-lag model in Table 3 Panel A for illustration. Even one year after a detailing visit occurred or a free sample was issued, their effects are only slightly diminished. Model X.3 demonstrates that ignoring a fixed effect and estimating a distributed lag structure (or using some form of discounted cumulative detailing and sampling) may lead to erroneous conclusions about the duration and the magnitude of the effects.
Model X.4 allows for persistence (autocorrelation) in prescribing practices. The estimated effects of persistence for drug B are highly overstated. The implied total persistence is at .89. The autoregressive coefficients are picking up the impact of the omitted fixed effect. Interestingly, many lagged terms for detailing and sampling are negative and significant. Moreover, the implied cumulative direct effect (and thus the total effect) of detailing in Model X.4 is negative and significant.
A Hausman specification test documents the presence of significant physician-specific effects in prescribing behavior. As such, the models in Panel A of Model X.5 is the most basic fixed effects specification that allows for physician-specific effects and contemporaneous effects for detailing and sampling. By ignoring persistence and carryover effects, the estimated effects from this model understate both the direct and total effects for detailing and sampling.
Model X.6 adds a distributed lag structure to assess possible carry-over effects of detailing and sampling. In contrast to Model X.3, we observe carry-over effects with a clear dissipation pattern. In six months the effects of detailing and sampling are fully dissipated. In contrast to Model X.5, Model X.6 shows a significant increase in the direct effects of detailing and sampling. The results differ from the Equation 2 estimates in that the total effect of detailing and sampling are under-reported by not accounting for persistence.
Model X.7 addresses persistence in physician behavior by including a lagged dependent variable. 11 Compared to Table 2 results, the estimate of persistence in the specification is extremely low: it suggests no persistence in physicians' prescribing behavior. In fact, this result is a consequence of omitted variable bias -a complex dynamic process determines persistence and we need to model the dynamics of own and competitive prescriptions issuing to capture this process.
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